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1.1 Introduction
Most of the literature on international trade that has accumulated over
the last 300 years has dealt with trade in goods, and almost every country
has had in place for many years a system of collecting information on such
trade. In the mercantilist era, a surplus of exports over imports of goods
was sought as a way of acquiring gold, and imports of goods were carefully
watched and counted as a source of tax revenue. As a result, there has been
an apparatus in place for measuring the inﬂow and outﬂow of goods in
every country for centuries, based on counting and appraising the value of
goods as they crossed the country’s borders. Trade in goods among regions
of a country is often studied by trying to approximate the movement of
goods across regional, provincial, or state borders. Only recently, with the
establishment of the single market in the European Union, have some ma-
jor trading countries moved away from the traditional reliance on customs
declarations at borders and been forced to invent other ways of measuring
trade in goods (OECD 2001, 3).
The collection of data on trade in goods is governed by recommenda-
tions set forth in United Nations (2004), which interprets, for compilers of
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countries use “. . . crossing the border rather than change of ownership as
the basic principle for compilation of trade statistics . . .” (p. 5). The geo-
graphical basis of the data is emphasized by the recommendation that the
data should “record all goods which add to or subtract from the stock of
natural resources of a country by entering (imports) or leaving (exports) its
economic territory” (p. 74), and by the deﬁnition of the partner in terms of
the “statistical territory of each country” (p. 75) or, when free zones are in-
volved, the economic territory if the reporting country uses “the strict ver-
sion of the special system of trade.” The deﬁnitions are all based on geo-
graphy rather than ownership.
The measurement of trade in goods for the balance of payments has a
diﬀerent objective. That is the measurement of changes in the ownership 
of goods between residents and nonresidents of a country. Because the
great majority of such changes in ownership take place in connection with
the physical movement of the goods, the measures are quantitatively close,
and the balance of payments measures are mainly dependent on the data
for the physical movement of goods and also very close to them. However,
since imports are reported on a cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) basis in
the goods trade data, and the balance of payments concept separates
freight and insurance costs from the value of the physical commodities,
one adjustment that is required is to peel oﬀthose costs and, if they are pur-
chased from foreigners, transfer them to the trade in services account.
Most of the diﬀerences between trade statistics and balance-of-
payments measures for trade in goods involve the dependence of the bal-
ance of payments accounts on change of ownership rather than physical
movement. Thus, the trade statistics include, and the balance of payments
data exclude, goods purchased by travelers and brought home; while there
is a change in location, there is no change of ownership. Trade data include,
but balance of payments ﬁgures exclude, exports transferred under U.S.
military agency sales contracts. Other adjustments involve, for example,
timing in terms of change of ownership rather than terms of the change in
the location of goods.
In contrast to exports and imports of goods, exports and imports of ser-
vices do not have alternative measurements based on either physical move-
ments or ownership. Exports and imports of services exist only in the bal-
ance of payments universe. As is observed in United Nations (2002a) and
similarly in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD 2001), “measurement of trade in services is inherently more diﬃ-
cult than measurement of trade in goods.[. . .] Unlike trade in goods, for
trade in services there is no package crossing the customs frontier with an
internationally recognized commodity code, a description of the contents,
information on quantity, origin, and destination, an invoice and an ad-
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assembling these data” (p. 5). The diﬀerence is more than a question of
documentation. Exports or imports of services often involve no crossing of
an international boundary by the service, but only a crossing of a border
by the consumer of the service. Some exports or imports of services are ge-
ographically domestic transactions made international solely by a diﬀer-
ence in country of residence between the buyer and the seller of the service.
It is a balance of payments concept more than a physical trade concept,
and the deﬁnition of residence plays a crucial part in deﬁning what trade in
services is.
United Nations (2002a), following the precedent of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), broadens its concept of international
trade in services beyond the balance of payments deﬁnition. The broaden-
ing adds to the balance of payments deﬁnition, the supply of services
through GATS mode 3 and part of GATS mode 4. The GATS mode 3 is
the supply of services “. . . by a service supplier of one [WTO] Member
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member . . .” 
(p. 11). The GATS mode 4, some of which is included in the balance of pay-
ments, is the supply of a service “. . . by a service supplier of one [WTO]
Member through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory
of any other Member . . .” (p. 11).
Because data on foreign aﬃliate provision of services are very limited in
most countries and there is no suggestion of a similar expansion of the con-
cept of trade in goods in United Nations (2004), the comparisons to trade
in goods here are conﬁned to the conventional balance of payments deﬁni-
tion, including in service trade only exports and imports of services.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the size of exports and imports
of services, and their composition, by type of service. It continues with an
attempt to judge how fast the growth in service exports and imports has
been, relative to trade in goods and to the production of services. The next
topic is the problems that arise from the lack of any accounting for ﬂows of
human capital. The ﬁnal topic is the problems in the measurement of ser-
vice exports and imports caused by the ambiguities in deﬁning the location
of service production, particularly service production based on intangible
and ﬁnancial assets. If the location of production is ambiguous, the dis-
tinction between home production and imports of services is correspond-
ingly ambiguous, as is the distinction between home consumption and ex-
ports. These ambiguities then infect measures of the current balance and
of domestic production. The measurement diﬃculties are exacerbated by
the deliberate manipulation of the apparent location of production; for the
avoidance or reduction of corporate taxes by appearing to move produc-
tion to low-tax locations. The chapter ends with suggestions for measure-
ments of service trade that would reduce some of these ambiguities.
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Exports and imports of services have been something of an orphan in in-
ternational measurement of trade. The report on The Network of World
Trade, mostly by Folke Hilgerdt (League of Nations 1942) hardly men-
tioned exports and imports of services, except to suggest that exports and
imports probably oﬀset each other for most countries. Interest in service
trade has grown recently, especially since services became part of interna-
tional trade negotiations, but it is hard to say just how large these exports
and imports of services are because the completeness of reporting varies
greatly across countries. Some countries publish data that cover only lim-
ited types of services.
Some important participants in trade in ﬁnancial services, such as
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, did not report to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) at all for many years. Bermuda announced
(Bermuda 2006) that it was bringing its reporting into substantial compli-
ance with IMF standards, and data on that basis are now available on the
Bermuda Department of Statistics website, beginning with 2006. Bermuda
omits from its balance of payments transactions on the income account of
what it calls “exempted companies.” These are ﬁrms whose business is out-
side Bermuda, and are not permitted to do business in Bermuda except by
special license. Their contribution to Bermuda’s gross national product is
based only on expenditure in Bermuda. Because they are considered non-
resident companies, their income is omitted from Bermuda’s national ac-
counts, including the balance of payments. However, the sales of services
by these companies outside Bermuda are counted as imports from
Bermuda by the countries purchasing them, although Bermuda does not
consider them exports. Other oﬀshore ﬁnancial centers, such as the Cay-
man Islands, remain nonreporters to the IMF.
Many countries that report to the IMF do not report service exports and
imports. Those that do reported exports of $US 2,487 billion and imports
of $US 2,371 billion in 2005 (table 1A.1). Of these countries, the 150 that
reported both goods and services exports and imports reported exports
of services that were 25.4 percent of exports of goods, and imports of ser-
vices that were 24.1 percent of imports of goods (table 1A.1), close to one
quarter.
It is hard to judge how fast exports and imports of services have been
growing because the number of countries measuring them has increased,
and the number of categories covered by surveys and reporting has been
growing over time, but to inconsistent degrees in diﬀerent countries. For
twenty-two countries that have reported service exports and imports to the
IMF since 1972, and accounted for close to half of “world” exports of ser-
vices in 2005, the reported ratio of service exports to goods exports grew
from 21 to 28 percent between 1972–76 and 2002–6. The corresponding
30 Robert E. Lipseyratio for imports barely changed, staying at 24 to 25 percent over that same
period (table 1.1). For a larger group of thirty countries that have reported
service exports and imports since 1977, and accounted for two thirds of
“world” service exports in 2005, the ratio of service exports to goods
exports grew from about 22 to 28 percent between 1977–81 and 2002–6.
The ratio for imports grew from 24 to 25 percent to a peak of 28 percent in
1992 through 1996, and has since settled back to around 26 percent. Thus,
there is some indication of an upward trend in the reported ratio of service
to goods exports and imports since the 1970s.
Many countries are dropped from the recent IMF Balance of Payments
CDs for years before 1972, presumably because the deﬁnitions and mea-
sures of service exports and imports did not match the current deﬁnitions.
However, it is possible to put together series extending back to 1961 for
twenty-four of the larger countries from earlier IMF data (IMF 1991).
These show a decline from 27 to 25 percent on the export side and 32 to 28
percent on the import side. The extension suggests, if anything, a some-
what smaller increase in the ratio on the export side and a larger decline on
the import side, but no very large changes over more than forty years.
A further indication of the trend in the world importance of service ex-
ports and imports can be gleaned from estimates for 1950 to 1954, pur-
portedly covering the whole world (Woolley 1966, table 3). The ratios
quoted here exclude investment income, treated as service trade in the
source). On the export side, they show service exports 21.6 percent of
goods exports, below the 1961 ratio, but almost the same as the average ra-
tio for the ﬁrst ﬁve years, starting in 1972, in table 1.1. On the import side,
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Table 1.1 Service exports and imports as percent of goods exports and imports
22 Countriesa 30 Countriesb
Year Credit Debit Credit Debit
1972–1976 21.02 23.94 n.a. n.a.
1977–1981 20.93 24.26 21.93 24.69
1982–1986 23.92 25.19 23.33 25.52
1987–1991 25.36 25.23 24.66 26.87
1992–1996 27.20 26.05 26.01 28.00
1997–2001 27.56 25.00 26.22 26.29
2002–2006 28.40 24.77 27.65 25.78
Source: Appendix table 1A.1.
Note: n.a.   not available.
a The 22 countries include Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Dominican
Rep., Germany, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Vene-
zuela.
b The 30 countries include the 22 countries, plus Argentina, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil,
Denmark, Finland, France, India, and Japan.the estimated ratio in 1950 to 1954 is over 24 percent, again below the 1961
ratio, but almost exactly the average of 1972 to 1976 in table 1.1. Thus,
there is little indication of a strong trend in the ratio in the last ﬁfty years if
we assume that the adjustments made to the data for the earlier period by
Woolley had been adopted in the oﬃcial data by 1972, or at least by 2002.
However, if the same omissions in the oﬃcial services data remain, and
they are equally important in the later period, some long-term rise in the
service/goods export and import trade ratios is implied.
For the more distant past, before 1950, the picture is even dimmer. Viner
(1924) claimed that Argentina was the only country for which “. . . com-
prehensive statistics of export and import services are oﬃcially collected
and published . . .” but that the British Board of Trade “had recently begun
the collection of similar statistics . . .” (p. 63, fn 1). He did report, for freight
costs alone, ratios from several sources of freight charges to world imports
of goods, derived by what he referred to as “Hobson’s method,” based on
the world excess of reported imports over reported exports. This ratio ﬂuc-
tuated mainly between 6 and 9 percent from 1901 through 1912, but with
no obvious trend.
One reason for being suspicious about the apparent rising trend in ser-
vice trade relative to goods trade is that not only has the number of coun-
tries reporting service trade to the IMF risen over the last ﬁfty years, and
even the last thirty years, but among those reporting, the number report-
ing particular types of service trade has increased even more. While the
number of countries reporting total service exports to the IMF has not
changed greatly from 1985 to 2005, the number reporting exports of, for ex-
ample, construction services, rose from seven to 88; ﬁnancial services, ten
to 105; computer and information services, one to 100; and personal, cul-
tural, and recreational services, four to 91 (table 1.2). In some cases, the
services may not have existed in the particular countries, or may not have
been exported at all. In other cases, they might have been reported under
“other business services.” Neither of these reasons would imply any bias in
the overall ratios. However, it seems more likely that at least some of these
services were traded, but no device was in place for collection of data on
them, in which case the increasing numbers of reporters would imply up-
ward bias in the measured ratios of service exports and imports to goods
trade.
The same information for imports of services is provided in table 1.3. In
most cases, collection and reporting of data on particular imports and ex-
ports moved together, but there were exceptions. Reports of freight imports
increased faster than those on freight exports, and the same was true for
reports on insurance imports and construction imports. In general, how-
ever, types of services poorly reported in import records were the same as
those poorly reported in export records, and the biases are probably simi-
lar on the two sides of the account.
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export side
1975 1985 1995 2005
Total services 61 146 157 150
Transportation 60 137 153 146
Passenger 39 99 111 117
Freight 49 111 111 119
Other transportation 55 113 116 118
Travel 60 138 151 147
Government services, n.i.e. 56 119 139 138
Other services
Communications 8 19 94 127
Construction 3 7 54 88
Insurance 44 100 117 130
Financial 2 10 61 105
Computer and information 0 1 43 100
Royalties and license fees 19 35 66 91
Other business services 60 139 145 136
Personal, cultural, and recreational 3 4 43 91
Source: IMF (2007)
Table 1.3 Number of countries reporting trade in various services from the
import side
1975 1985 1995 2005
Total services 62 146 157 150
Transportation 62 145 155 148
Passenger 44 102 115 123
Freight 61 145 136 133
Other transportation 51 106 113 109
Travel 60 140 154 147
Government services, n.i.e. 57 125 143 143
Other services
Communications 9 21 92 126
Construction 4 6 64 102
Insurance 57 139 142 141
Financial 3 10 69 113
Computer and information 0 2 47 111
Royalties and license fees 26 55 85 120
Other business services 60 141 154 143
Personal, cultural, and recreational 6 10 53 99
Source: IMF (2007)Reported imports of services were about 10 percent larger than reported
exports in 1950 to 1954 (Woolley 1966, table 3). The same was true among
twenty-two countries until the 1990s, sometimes by 10 percent or more, but
the totals have been much closer in size since then. That same trend is
shown in the data for thirty countries since 1977, with the latest ﬁgures
showing exports and imports almost equal in size (table 1A.1). Either com-
parative advantages in service production have shifted toward these groups
of twenty-two and thirty countries or there have been more improvements
in measuring service exports than in measuring service imports.
If there has not been any strong trend in world service exports and im-
ports relative to world goods trade over the last half century, as is suggested
by these estimates, the growth of service exports and imports has outpaced
the growth of world GDP, since the ratio of goods trade to GDP has risen
substantially. The world ratio of goods exports to GDP was under 10 per-
cent in 1960 and 1970 but had risen to more than 20 percent by 2000 to
2006 (table 1.4). World production appears to have moved from goods-
producing industries (half the total in 1960, but less than a third in 2000 to
2006) to service-producing industries (table 1.5); one might have expected
a corresponding shift in the composition of exports and imports from
goods to services. The absence of any obvious shift in that direction implies
that the growth of exports and imports relative to output has been slower
in services than in goods.
The rough stability in the ratio of service exports and imports to goods
exports and imports may reﬂect the fact that we are comparing nominal
rather than deﬂated or real values of the two types of trade. If prices of
traded services have fallen relative to prices of traded goods, the stability
of the nominal ratio may conceal a more rapid growth in real service ex-
ports and imports. If relative prices of traded services have risen, on the
other hand, the stability of the services/goods trade ratio would imply a de-
cline in the importance of service trade in real terms. That question is dis-
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Table 1.4 World exports of goods as percent of world GDP
World GDP  Exports of goods 
Year ($US billions) ($US billions) Percent (%)
1960a 1,504 130 8.6
1970a 3,275 317 9.7
1970 3,402 312 9.2
1970–1979 6,250 847 13.6
1980–1989 14,584 2,230 15.3
1990–1999 27,282 4,620 16.9
2000–2006 38,213 8,353 21.9
Sources: GDP: UN (1993b); IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2007). Exports:
1960–1984: GATT (1985); 1985–1990: GATT (1994); 1991–2006: WTO (2007).
aEstimates from UN(1993b).cussed more fully following, in connection with U.S. trade, for which we
have slightly more data. However, for the world as a whole, it should not be
assumed that the rise in service prices relative to goods prices typically
found in domestic price comparisons applies to prices of internationally
traded services. Domestic prices of services are heavily weighted with la-
bor-intensive services, but the composition of internationally traded ser-
vices may be very diﬀerent. For example, the commodity market integra-
tion that took place in the nineteenth century and continued in the
twentieth has been associated with, among other determinants, “. . .
changes in the technologies of communication, transaction, and trans-
port,” according to a recent study (Jacks 2006, 405). These are not the pre-
dominant components of domestic service price indexes. The same study
also suggested that trade costs were “. . . more responsive to changes in
monetary regimes and commercial policy than changes in the underlying
technology of transport” (p. 405), even further removed from the elements
of domestic service price indexes.
A rough idea of the composition of world service trade and changes in
composition over the last twenty years, as reported by the IMF, is given by
table 1.6. The three major elements are “transportation,” “travel,” and
“other business services.” The major change in composition that is visible
in both exports and imports is the decline in importance of “Freight” and
“Other transportation,” reduced by about one third. Some of this reduc-
tion may be an eﬀect of containerization and other productivity improve-
ments, but some may be an artifact of the improvement in the reporting of
“Other services” that can be seen in tables 1.2 and 1.3. The share of pas-
senger transportation held up better than that of goods transportation.
There was also a large decline in the importance of “Government services,
n.i.e.,” which include “. . . services (such as expenditures of embassies and
consulates) associated with government sectors or international and re-
gional organizations and not classiﬁed other items” (IMF 2004, xxvi).
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Sources: UN (1993b); UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, downloaded on
Dec. 19, 2007.
aConstruction is classiﬁed as goods.
bData are from UN (1993b).The composition of reported imports is considerably diﬀerent from that
of reported exports. The direction and size of the discrepancies between re-
ported export and reported import totals vary across service categories,
probably because reporting by developed countries is more complete than
that by developing countries. Thus, reported imports of freight trans-
portation are larger than reported exports, probably because imports of
freight transportation services are mainly by developed countries, and the
exports, at least nominally, from developing countries.
On the other hand, for “Financial” and “Computer and Information”
services, reported exports are larger than reported imports, presumably be-
cause these are mainly export items for developed countries. “Insurance”
services are an exception among business services in that reported exports
are smaller than reported imports. One reason may be that exports are, rel-
ative to country size, disproportionately concentrated in Bermuda, which
did not report to the IMF at all. That situation may not change much be-
cause Bermuda treats some international operations as outside its econ-
omy and excludes such transactions from its reported national income and
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Table 1.6 The composition of world service trade, 1985 and 2005 (%)
Exports Imports
1985 2005 1985 2005
Total services 100 100 100 100
Transportationa 27 21 31 26
Passenger 5445
Freight 13 9 19 14
Other transportation 8585
Travel 28 27 23 26
Government services, n.i.e. 7393





Computer and information 0402
Royalties and license fees 3526
Other business service 25 24 21 22
Personal, Cultural, and Recreational 0101
Sources: IMF (2007); Republic of China (Taiwan) (1987).
aThe imports and exports of component services under “Transportation” do not add up to
the imports and exports of “Transportation”, presumably because not all countries report the
components.
bThe imports and exports of “Other services” are calculated by subtracting the imports and
exports of transportation, travel, and government services from total services. The “Other
services” total includes Taiwan, but the breakdown does not.product accounts and trade data, while the importing countries will report
importing these services from Bermuda (Bermuda 2006).
Over twenty years, the main trend in the direction of service export and
import ﬂows is that the share of industrial countries in exports has de-
clined, while their share of service imports has risen. The share in imports
of the Euro area rose, and that accounted for most of the increase in in-
dustrial country imports.
1.3 The Size and Growth of U.S. Trade in Services
The United States has been a leader in measuring service trade, perhaps
because it oﬀers a more cheerful picture of the U.S. international position
than the goods trade account. In 2006, the United States reported a surplus
of exports over imports in service trade of $US 88 billion, in contrast to a
deﬁcit in goods trade of $US 850 billion (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis [henceforth, BEA] 2007).
Services have recently been much larger relative to goods in U.S. exports
(over 40 percent) than in U.S. imports (a little under 20 percent), presum-
ably reﬂecting U.S. comparative advantage in service industries (ﬁg. 1.1).
Service exports were about 60 percent as large as service imports during
the 1930s, became larger than imports during World War II, fell back to
half in the early 1950s, and then began to grow faster. By the early 1970s
service exports began to surpass imports and have done so ever since.
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Fig. 1.1 U.S. exports and imports of services as percent of U.S. exports and im-
ports of goods, current dollars, by decades: 1790–1999 and average of 2000–2006
Source: Table 1A.2However, in the last ﬁve years, service import growth has outpaced service
export growth (table 1A.2).
The large current importance of services relative to goods in U.S. exports
is not unprecedented. In the ﬁrst thirty years of balance of payments
records, 1790 to 1819, U.S. service exports averaged about a third of goods
exports. Two of the early periods shown in ﬁgure 1.1, 1800 to 1809 and
1810 to 1819, were aﬀected by the Napoleonic Wars and the accompany-
ing blockades and embargos, as Marshall Reinsdorf reminded me in a per-
sonal communication. It is not obvious how these would have aﬀected the
values of service exports and imports associated with trade, as compared
with the value of trade itself, given the impacts on prices as well as quanti-
ties of trade and services, as discussed in several recent articles (e.g.,
O’Rourke 2006).
After the 1820s, the importance of service exports relative to goods ex-
ports trended downward, reaching a level of only 2 percent of exports of
goods in the early 1900s. Then service exports began a long rise in impor-
tance, leading to the current high levels (ﬁg. 1.1).
Services were more important in U.S. exports than in U.S. imports in the
early days of the United States, usually more than twice as important
through the 1840s. After the Civil War, the relation was reversed, and ser-
vices were generally much more important in imports than in exports in the
latter half of the nineteenth century and through the 1960s, reaching well
over 40 percent of goods imports during the years when goods imports
were aﬀected by World War II and the postwar recovery. As goods imports
grew rapidly starting in the 1970s, the ratio of service to goods imports re-
ceded to around 20 percent, where it has remained since the 1970s (ﬁg. 1.1).
Services have often been treated as nontradables, and they are, in fact,
less traded than goods, relative to their output. That is, exports and im-
ports of services have been much smaller relative to the U.S. domestic out-
put of services, than exports and imports of goods, relative to the U.S. do-
mestic production of goods, at least since 1869. Aside from World War II,
service exports were almost always less than 2 percent of domestic service
output until the 1960s, according to contemporary estimates (later revised
to almost 3 percent for the 1960s). Since then, they have grown to usually
about 5 percent of service output. Goods exports have generally been
much larger relative to goods output during the same period, often 10 to 14
percent before World War I, falling back to 7 or 8 percent from 1929
through the 1960s and then rising, to above 20 percent in most of the last
decade (ﬁg. 1.2). Service imports in current dollars were over 3 percent of
U.S. domestic service output during the 1960s, and reached over 4 percent
of U.S. service output in recent years. Goods imports were 10 percent of
domestic goods output in most of the late nineteenth century, ranged from
5 to 8 percent of goods output most years from then through the 1960s, and
38 Robert E. LipseyFig. 1.2 U.S. exports of goods and services as percent of U.S. domestic output of
goods and services, current dollars, by decades: 1869–1999 and average of 2000–
2006
Source: Tables 1A.3 and 1A.4.
then soared, to reach 35 to 40 percent of domestic goods production since
2000 (ﬁg. 1.3).
The relation of service to goods exports and imports and the diﬀerent
movements of trade/output ratios in the two sectors may reﬂect diﬀerences
in price movements. As David Richardson pointed out in his comments at
the conference, the oﬃcial data on implicit prices underlying GDP and
those for exports both show prices of services rising relative to those for
goods. For example, between 1929 and 2006, domestic prices for services
rose by over three times as much as domestic prices of goods, and export
prices of services rose almost two-and-a-half times as fast as export prices
of goods (table 1A.8). If we accept these price estimates, they present a very
diﬀerent picture of the relation of service to goods exports and imports
from that in the nominal data, in some respects. In particular, they show
the ratio of services to goods in U.S. exports fairly stable from the 1960s
through the early 1990s, and then declining, instead of rising sharply
through the 1970s and the 1980s. And they show the ratio in U.S. imports
to have fallen throughout the 1990s, instead of being stable (ﬁg. 1.4).
The translation from nominal to real, or constant dollar, terms makes
much less diﬀerence to the comparisons of exports and imports to output
in goods and services than to the comparison of services to goods exports
and imports (ﬁgs. 1.5 and 1.6). The reason is that the reported disparity in
price movements between goods and services in trade is very similar to that
in domestic production.
Measuring International Trade in Services 39Fig. 1.3 U.S. imports of goods and services as percent of U.S. domestic output of
goods and services, current dollars, by decades: 1869–1999 and average of 2000–
2006
Source: Tables 1A.3 and 1A.4.
Fig. 1.4 U.S. exports and imports of services as percent of U.S. exports and im-
ports of goods in 2000 prices
Source: Table 1A.5.Fig. 1.5 U.S. exports as percent of U.S. domestic output of goods and services in
2000 prices
Source: Tables 1A.6 and 1A.7.
Fig. 1.6 U.S. imports as percent of U.S. domestic output of goods and services in
2000 prices
Source: Tables 1A.6 and 1A.7.One problem with all of these comparisons in constant dollars, or in real
terms, is that price measurement in the service sector, and corresponding
quantity measurement, are the weakest parts of the national accounts. Two
volumes of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (CRIW) se-
ries, Griliches (1992) and Cutler and Berndt (2001), devoted a great deal of
attention to the problems of measurement of prices and output in this sec-
tor. It is hard to have much conﬁdence in the existing measures. The prob-
lems for trade in services are worse than for domestic production, because
the collection of prices for service trade is at a very early stage, as indicated
in the paper by Khatchadourian and Wiesner (2006). They mention that
the BLS International Price Program has collected service price indexes
that cover “. . . approximately 8 percent of export service trade and 23 per-
cent of import services trade” (p. 2). In the absence of extensive price col-
lection, the BEA has used various crude proxies, described for earlier years
in United States, BEA (1987). For freight transportation, values were ex-
trapolated by tonnage, implying that value per ton measured price move-
ments, and for fees and royalties and other private services, the implicit
price deﬂator for GDP was used.
The long-term history of costs of freight transportation, one of the
largest segments of international services trade (about one third of all ser-
vice trade in 1950 to 1954, according to Woolley [1966]) suggests that they
were falling relative to prices of goods in general. The evidence includes
convergence of prices between origin and destination countries and calcu-
lations of freight rates themselves, documented in papers by many authors,
some of which are discussed and summarized in Mohammed and
Williamson (2004). For other major parts of international service trade,
such as communication and business services, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd price
records. However, they do not seem likely candidates for large increases in
price relative to goods; communication costs were almost certainly falling.
The ratios of trade to output, particularly for goods, exaggerate the im-
portance of trade somewhat, because while the production ﬁgures are out-
put net of purchases from other industries, export and import ﬁgures are
gross of such purchases. Because such purchases are more important in
goods industries than in service industries, the exaggeration of the impor-
tance of trade is greater for goods than for services.
Estimates of U.S. service trade are still a work in progress. A report by
the Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that exports of ser-
vices, excluding banking services, were about 60 percent higher than “Oﬃ-
cial U.S. Government ﬁgures” in 1983 and 1984, and that imports of ser-
vices were 40 to 50 percent higher in those years (U.S. Congress, Oﬃce of
Technology Assessment 1986, table 1). The latest oﬃcial BEA calculations
of service exports and imports are quite close to the OTA estimates for
those years, but somewhat larger for 1984 (Sauers and Pierce 2005, table 1).
The path to the revised, and much higher, estimates of trade in services
42 Robert E. Lipseywas described in the appendix to Whichard and Borga (2002). That path
began with new legislation in 1984 that permitted BEA to conduct surveys
of trade in services. The ﬁrst benchmark survey was carried out for 1986,
and annual follow-up surveys began in 1987. Also in that year, medical ser-
vice exports were estimated for the ﬁrst time and primary insurance ser-
vices were added to previous estimates of reinsurance transactions. Esti-
mates of expenditures by foreign students in the United States and U.S.
students abroad started in 1989. In 1990, services were redeﬁned to exclude
investment income. In 1992, trade in services between U.S. and foreign par-
ents and their aﬃliates was placed on a gross, instead of a net, basis (in-
creasing both exports and imports of services), coverage of transportation
services was increased, and some new services were added to the 1991
benchmark. Truck transportation services between the United States and
Canada were added to the service trade account in 1995. In 1996, BEA be-
gan what is known as the “Benchmark Survey of Financial Services Trans-
actions Between U.S. Financial Services Providers and Unaﬃliated For-
eign Persons.” Since then, there have been other improvements (described
in Borga and Mann [2003, 2004] and in articles in later October issues of
the Survey of Current Business) in measures of transportation services and
reclassiﬁcations of software royalties and license fees, leasing of trans-
portation equipment, compensation of employees, new sources for exports
of medical services, imports of travel, and various other items.
One consequence of all these improvements in data collection and ex-
pansions in the list of services covered is that historical comparisons over
long periods are questionable. The earliest estimates of U.S. service exports
included only shipping earnings, and later also port charges on foreign
ships, and foreign tourist expenditures in the United States. The closest ap-
proximation to these items in the current accounts, travel and transporta-
tion services, accounted for only 38 percent of service exports in 2006
(Koncz and Flatness 2007, 114). The same items cover more of the current
imports of services, a little over half (pp. 104, 115).
Many services in the early United States were performed by foreign com-
panies’ agents or by aﬃliates of foreign ﬁrms, which possessed skills not
common in the United States at that time. Wilkins (1989) quotes a letter to
Alexander Hamilton, referring to Virginia to the eﬀect that “‘the trade of
this state is carried on chieﬂy with foreign (British) capital. Those engaged
in it [the trade] hardly deserve the name of merchants, being factors,
agents, and Shop-keepers of the Merchants and Manufacturers of Great
Britain . . .’.” Wilkins goes on to say that the passage does not reveal
whether these were “. . . salaried, or partners in the British ﬁrms,” in which
case they might have represented imports of services into the United
States, or “. . . ﬁnancially independent units that acted for British houses
on a purely commission basis” (p. 40), in which case they might have rep-
resented U.S. exports of services. Wilkins also reports that America’s na-
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factory basis for the largest American banks to participate in foreign trade
ﬁnancing . . .” and that as a result, “. . . to ﬁnance much of that trade,
American enterprises depended on foreign (mainly British) banking ser-
vices” (p. 463). Outside of banking, Wilkins notes that “. . . in 1914, the
United States had to rely on foreign-owned shipping, foreign-owned ca-
bles, and foreign-owned radio communication” (p. 524). Shipping services
were recorded in the balance of payments, but not the others.
Of course, many of the services traded currently, such as telecommuni-
cations and ﬁlm and television tape rentals, did not exist very long ago, but
there apparently were many services that did exist and were not recorded.
It is therefore diﬃcult to be sure how much of the apparent trend in the
share of service trade in total U.S. trade is genuine.
1.4 The Deﬁnition of Residence and Trade in Educational Services
The measurement of trade in more and more services places a great deal
of weight on the deﬁnition of residence, because the identiﬁcation of resi-
dence can change what is, on the face of it, a domestic transaction into an
international transaction. One case in which the attribution of residence
changes a domestic demand on a country’s resources into an international
demand is that of foreign students, who are treated in the U.S. accounts as
residents of the country from which they come, with the result that their
costs of education and living expenses become a service export of the
United States. The service that is simply domestic production and con-
sumption or investment in human capital if a student is a resident of the
United States is an export of educational services if the student is classiﬁed
as a foreign resident. In other countries, the criteria for deﬁning foreign
students are diverse, including citizenship, “. . . nationality, place of birth,
former domicile . . .”, and in some cases can include students born in the
host country (Larsen, Martin, and Morris 2002, 852).
Since many students choose to stay in the host country after their edu-
cation is completed, the services exported to those students’ home coun-
tries never leave the host countries. The service exports are reimported
when the students become host country residents, an item missed in
the balance of payments. Alternatively, the exported educational services
could be thought of as turning into an import of human capital by the host
country, a type of import that is not recognized in the balance of payments.
The U.S. exports of educational services more than doubled in value be-
tween 1992 and 2006, reaching $14.6 billion (Koncz and Flatness 2007),
but there are no comprehensive data on what proportion of these service
exports in fact never leave the United States. A hint that the share staying
in the United States might be important is provided by data on intentions
to stay expressed by foreign recipients of science and engineering doctor-
44 Robert E. Lipseyates in the United States. There are data on “intentions to stay,” and on
“deﬁnite plans to stay.” Among students from countries accounting for
about three quarters of such doctorates between 1985 and 1996, an inten-
tion to stay in the United States was expressed by half in 1985, rising to 70
percent in 1995 and 1996. Among degree recipients from all countries,
“plans to stay” were expressed by 68 percent in 1992 to 1995, 72 percent in
1996 to 1999, and 74 percent in 2000 to 2003. A “ﬁrm plan to stay,” mean-
ing that the student had accepted a deﬁnite oﬀer of a postdoctoral ap-
pointment or employment in the United States, was reported from 36 to 46
percent of the doctoral recipients over 1985 through 1996, and “deﬁnite
plans to stay” was reported from 35 percent in 1992 to 1995, to 46 percent
in 1996 to 1999, and 51 percent in 2000 to 2003 (National Science Foun-
dation 1998b, 2006, appendix table 2-33).
The data on plans to stay do not reveal outcomes. Some indication of the
fulﬁllment of these plans is that of about 8,000 temporary residents receiv-
ing science and engineering doctorates in 1998, over 60 percent were still
in the United States in 2003 (National Science Foundation 2006, table 
3-24).
Recipients of doctorates were only a small part of the 13 percent foreign-
born share in R&D scientists and engineers in the United States in 1993,
although the foreign-born were more important among PhDs than among
those with less education. At all degree levels, about two-thirds of the
foreign-born scientists and engineers employed in the United States had
received their training in the United States (National Science Foundation
1998a, table 1), for the most part, probably, from U.S. exports of educa-
tional services.
If some substantial part of education exports remains in the United
States, there is no clear way to recognize that fact in the current balance of
payments framework. Presumably, the students’ ﬁnancial assets and liabil-
ities should enter the accounts when they become residents. The estimated
total was fairly small, under $1 billion in 2002, when it was noted that the
average immigrant is relatively young—younger and less wealthy than the
average emigrant (Bach 2003, 43–44). Students deciding to stay perma-
nently in the United States are in the category classiﬁed by the BEA as “le-
gal, adjusted-status immigrants” (Bach 2006, 43). The BEA apparently es-
timates the assets transferred by assigning to each immigrant his or her
nationality, multiplied by the average income in that country, multiplied by
the average ratio of wealth to income in that country (Bach 2006, 42–43).
The former students among these adjusted-status immigrants may diﬀer
substantially from the other members of that group. For one thing, they
may have more debt, although that is not necessarily the case. Of over
36,000 science and engineering doctorate recipients reporting, almost
three-quarters reported no undergraduate debt at the time of graduation
and almost two-thirds reported no graduate debt. The average graduate
Measuring International Trade in Services 45had about $6,000 in undergraduate school debt and about $11,000 in grad-
uate school debt (National Science Foundation 2006, appendix table 2-23).
These should enter the balance of payments at the time of deciding on U.S.
residence.
What would be required to complete the account for this transaction,
but does not exist, is some accounting for ﬂows of human capital. The de-
cisions of alien importers of U.S. education to settle in the United States
would then be treated as an import of human capital, analogous to the
standard ﬂows of ﬁnancial capital.
The impact of exports of education services may go beyond the tendency
of students to stay in the countries where they receive higher education.
Even if students do not stay after graduation, they may return as im-
migrants, carrying back the previously exported education services. One
study of immigration found that student ﬂows explained migration to
the United States more consistently than “. . . traditionally highlighted
economic variables.... ”   Similar relationships could be observed for mi-
gration to a cross-section of OECD countries (Dreher and Poutvaara
2005, 17).
The idea that there is a human capital ﬂow missing from the balance of
payments data was suggested a long time ago by Alfred Marshall: “En-
gland exports to India a good many able young men: they do not enter in
India’s list of imports; but it is claimed that they render to her services
whose value exceeds that of her total payments to them. They return to En-
gland (if they come back at all) after their best strength has been spent: they
are unreckoned exports from England. But that part of their incomes,
which they have saved, is likely to come back sooner or later in the form of
material goods which enter into her imports. On the other hand, India
counts those material goods among her exports to England: but of course
she makes no entry among her imports for the expensive young men who
have been sent to her” (Marshall 1923, 134–35).
1.5 Tax Havens and the Measurement of Trade in Services
There is a considerable literature, some of which is summarized in Hines
(2005) and in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006), which describes the eﬀect of
low rates of host country taxation in attracting investment and economic
activity by multinationals from the United States and probably even more
from other countries. Some of the activity attracted is production, but
much of it involves the shifting of income to avoid or reduce taxes. Hines
refers to “an impressive concentration of ﬁnancial activity in tax havens”
(p. 78). The thirty tax havens he lists accounted in 1999 for 0.7 percent of
the world’s population and 2.1 percent of world GDP, but for 4.8 percent
of net property, plant, and equipment of U.S. aﬃliates, 3.4 percent of em-
ployee compensation, and 3.7 percent of employment. These shares prob-
46 Robert E. Lipseyably represent production taking place in the tax havens and are not of con-
cern in connection with the measurement of their production or export of
services. However, these same tax haven aﬃliates accounted for 15.7 per-
cent of gross foreign assets of U.S. aﬃliates, 13.4 percent of sales, and “. . .
a staggering 30 percent of total foreign income . . .” (p. 78). “Much of re-
ported tax haven income consists of ﬁnancial ﬂows from other foreign
aﬃliates that parents own indirectly through their tax haven aﬃliates.
Clearly, American ﬁrms locate considerable ﬁnancial assets in foreign tax
havens, and their reported proﬁtability in tax havens greatly exceeds any
measure of their physical presence there” (p. 78). Hines goes on to suggest
that ﬁrms in other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, which
largely exempt their ﬁrms’ foreign income from taxation, have even
stronger incentives to locate investment and income production in tax
havens (p. 79). Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003, 68) refer to this ﬂexibility as
“. . . the ability of multinational ﬁrms to adjust the reported location of
their taxable proﬁts.” While this literature refers to American ﬁrms, there
has now been a series of papers describing the similar tax-minimizing ac-
tivities of European ﬁrms (e.g., Ramb 2007; Egger, Eggert, and Winner
2007; Overesch 2006; and Weichenrieder 2007).
Why is this of interest in understanding trade in services? This ability of
ﬁrms to shift the location of assets and proﬁts by paper transactions inter-
nal to the ﬁrm, whether or not the transactions are reported at market val-
ues, makes the location of the ﬁrms’ production ambiguous. That is true in
industries, such as banking and other ﬁnancial services, in which produc-
tion is intangible, and assets are mostly ﬁnancial and intangible assets. It is
also the case in other industries in which output is intangible, or based on
intellectual property. And it is the case in tangible goods industries in
which much of the value of the tangible goods stems from intangible assets.
The ambiguity in the location of production produces a corresponding am-
biguity in measures of exports and imports, particularly in services, where
there is no physical movement to observe. But even in industries where
physical movements of output can be observed, it is diﬃcult to identify the
location or locations of the value added, if intangible inputs are important.
Reported service exports by U.S. aﬃliates, worldwide and from main re-
gions, and a few selected countries, are shown in table 1.7, with compar-
isons to the service exports reported by the same countries, mainly to the
IMF. The aﬃliate exports are not reported as exports in the BEA surveys,
but as sales by aﬃliates other than local sales, divided between sales to the
United States and sales to other areas outside the host countries. The com-
parisons are very imprecise for a number of reasons. The U.S. aﬃliate non-
local sales of services are incomplete in several respects. One is that they do
not include banking—an important part of service exports worldwide—
because the BEA surveys of banks do not include the extensive list of ques-
tions asked of nonbanking parents and their aﬃliates. Secondly, the BEA















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.data are conﬁned to majority-owned aﬃliates, because minority-owned
aﬃliates are not asked the questions about destination of sales. Third, the
BEA data are heavily suppressed in publication, with very little country de-
tail available for Caribbean countries that account for much of trade in ﬁ-
nancial services.
The data reported by the countries to the IMF have other deﬁciencies.
They lack detail, and more important, several important countries in in-
ternational trade in services, such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, did
not report to the IMF at all in these years. However, Bermuda did report
exports and imports of services in its national accounts. For the world as a
whole, sales of services outside their host countries reported by U.S. aﬃli-
ates account for 6 percent or less of exports of services reported by host
countries. For western hemisphere countries outside of Central and South
America, reported sales outside the host countries by U.S. aﬃliates were
larger than the aggregate service exports reported by the host countries in
2005. That was particularly the case for Bermuda in both 1999 and 2005.
Either Bermuda did not consider these sales to be exports or it did not con-
sider these aﬃliates part of the Bermuda economy.
Table 1.8gives some hints about the peculiarities of U.S. aﬃliates in var-
ious host countries in 1999. Aﬃliates in the area called “Other Western
Hemisphere,” essentially islands in the Caribbean, owned enormous assets
relative to their labor input, measured by employment or employee com-
pensation. For example, while the average ratio of assets to employment
around the world was about $700,000 per employee, the ratios in the three
European countries shown were all over $1.7 million per employee, and
those for aﬃliates in “Other Western Hemisphere” were $9 million per em-
ployee. Within that group, aﬃliates in Bermuda had assets of over $16
million per employee1 and those in the UK Islands in the Caribbean, $28
million per employee. While worldwide, U.S. aﬃliates owned assets
twenty-one times their payrolls, those in “Other Western Hemisphere”
had assets over 300 times their payrolls. Their activities appear to be very
capital-intensive types of production.
Capital/labor ratios could diﬀer across countries because the industry
composition of production diﬀers, even if they were identical within in-
dustries. In fact, the country diﬀerences are evident within industries.
Table 1.8 shows the ratios for depository institutions and for ﬁnance (ex-
cept depository institutions), and insurance. In the case of depository in-
stitutions, in which the worldwide average assets per employee in U.S. aﬃli-
ates was $10 million, U.S. aﬃliates in “Other Western Hemisphere” owned
$117 million of assets per employee. Their assets were more than 2,000
50 Robert E. Lipsey
1. That exceptional level for Bermuda, in terms of the direct investment position rather
than total assets, was pointed out in Mataloni (1995, 46), and attributed to the use of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.times their employee compensation, as compared with about 168 times
employee compensation worldwide.
In “other ﬁnance and insurance,” U.S. aﬃliates worldwide owned $6.6
million in assets per employee while those in Switzerland owned assets of
over $22 million per employee, those in Bermuda, almost $28 million per
employee, and those in “Other UK Islands,” over $60 million per em-
ployee. Worldwide, U.S. aﬃliates in this industry owned assets almost 100
times their payrolls, but those in Switzerland had assets 175 times their
payrolls and those in “Other Western Hemisphere,” had assets 300 to 400
times their payrolls (table 1.8).
The data for the two ﬁnance sectors make it clear that the loading of as-
sets on to U.S. aﬃliates in Switzerland and the Caribbean is not simply a
result of the industry composition of investment in those countries, but
represents a choice by parent companies in ﬁnancial service industries to
attribute assets to these locations.
The assets of U.S. aﬃliates, in countries where the ratio of assets to labor
inputs is particularly high, are not primarily physical assets, as can be seen
from table 1.9. The worldwide ratio of total assets to net property, plant,
and equipment in U.S. nonbank aﬃliates was 5.6 in 1999, but the ratio in
the Netherlands was almost 14; in Switzerland, 23; in Bermuda, 27; and
in UK Islands in the Caribbean, 34. Most of the assets of these asset-rich
aﬃliates were ﬁnancial assets or other assets, such as intangible or intel-
lectual property. It would be hard to deﬁne the location of these assets, and
if they are the basis for most of the output of these aﬃliates, one could say
that only statistical convention places that output in these aﬃliates’ host
countries.
Table 1.10 displays the “proﬁt-type return” relative to labor compensa-
tion, for those aﬃliates that are not only nonbank, but also majority-
owned for both 1999 and 2005. Proﬁt-type return “. . . measures proﬁts be-
fore income taxes, and it excludes nonoperating items (such as special
charges and capital gains and losses) and income from equity investments”
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2004, M-19). These ratios are clearly
related to the asset/labor ratios of table 1.8, even though they exclude in-
come on equity investments. While the worldwide ratios of proﬁt-type re-
turn to payrolls were 56 and 84 percent in the two years, those for Ireland
were 396 and 664 percent, and those for “Other Western Hemisphere”
were over 600 percent in 1999 and almost twice that in 2005. They were
around 1,300 and then 3,600 percent for aﬃliates in Bermuda, 3,000 per-
cent and more for those in Barbados, and well over 1,000 percent in UK Is-
lands and other countries in the Caribbean area. The extremely high ratios
of capital income to labor income were achieved by placing large amounts
of ﬁnancial and intangible capital in the aﬃliates in these countries, al-
though the capital may be far away from where an innocent observer might
think production took place.
52 Robert E. LipseyIn the case of one service imported into the United States, insurance ser-
vices, data are available for imports in recent years from all sources, not
only from U.S. aﬃliates (table 1.11). A few islands in the Caribbean, with
small populations and labor forces, were responsible for over half of U.S.
imports of insurance services in 2001 and 2004, and almost half in other
years. Extreme specialization is not impossible, but it is hard to think of
what resources in these islands produced all these insurance services. One
might suspect that the labor input took place in the home countries of the
ﬁrms nominally operating in Bermuda and that the capital input was from
ﬁnancial assets that had no real geographical location and were under the
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Table 1.9 Ratio of total assets to net property, plant, and equipment by nonbank
aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. parents, 1999
Ratio of total assets to net 








Latin America and other Western Hemisphere 4.66
Central and South America 3.11
Other Western Hemisphere 15.40
Barbados (D)
Bermuda 27.57
United Kingdom Islands, Caribbeana 34.33
Other, Western Hemisphereb 4.04
Bermuda and other, Western Hemisphereb 13.10
Middle East 2.19





Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004)
Note: (D) refers to the suppression of data.
a“United Kingdom Islands, Caribbean” comprises British Antilles, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, and Montserrat.
b“Other, Western Hemisphere” refers to Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas,
Cuba, Dominica, French Islands (Caribbean), Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands An-
tilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago,
and United Kingdom Islands (Atlantic).
c“Other Middle East” refers to Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria,
and Yemen.control of the parent companies, but could be placed under the ownership
of any aﬃliate, anywhere.
The allocation of ﬁnancial assets to low tax countries is probably the
most common distortion of the location of production, and along with
production, exports and imports. However, other intangible assets are sub-
ject to similar manipulation and the creation of phantom ﬂows of trade.
Ireland and Bermuda have been favorite locations for transfers of such as-
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Table 1.10 Ratio of proﬁt-type return to compensation of employees by majority-owned
nonbank aﬃliates of U.S. nonbank parents
1999 2005
Ratio of  Ratio of 
proﬁt-type return  proﬁt-type return 
to compensation  to compensation 
of employees of employees






United Kingdom 0.333 0.291
Latin America and other Western Hemisphere 0.771 1.555
Central and South America 0.466 0.978
Other Western Hemisphere 6.161 11.709
Barbados 30.884 34.967
Bermuda 13.007 36.062
United Kingdom Islands, Caribbeana 4.249 8.833
Other, Western Hemisphereb 1.655 6.347
Bermuda and other, Western Hemisphereb 6.714 15.794
Barbados and other, Western Hemisphereb 4.798 8.008
Middle East 1.084 1.837
Other Middle Eastc 5.887 9.403
Asia Paciﬁc 0.755 1.178
China 0.670 1.498
Hong Kong 0.898 0.953
Singapore 1.420 2.978
Sources:U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, www.bea.doc.gov (downloaded Sept. 2007).
a“United Kingdom Islands, Caribbean” comprises British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Is-
lands, and Montserrat.
b“Other, Western Hemisphere” refers to Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Cuba, Do-
minica, French Islands (Caribbean), Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and United Kingdom Islands (At-
lantic).
c“Other Middle East” refers to Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, and
Yemen.sets as software and drug patents (see, e.g., Simpson [2005], which lists
many companies’ Irish aﬃliates).
Publicly available data do not report individual company transactions,
but these moves by various ﬁrms seem to have made their mark in a num-
ber of places in aggregate data. It is diﬃcult to compare 1994 and 1999
BEA numbers by industry because of the shift from the Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation (SIC) to North American Industry Classiﬁcation Sys-
tem (NAICS) industry classiﬁcations, but this and similar transactions
may have ﬁgured in the more than tenfold growth over that period in the
sales of U.S. aﬃliates in Ireland classiﬁed as “Electronic and Other Electric
Equipment” or “Services” in 1994, or as “Computers and Electronic Prod-
ucts” or “Professional, Scientiﬁc and Technical Services” in 1999, from
$2.5 billion to $26 billion (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1998, 2004).
There was a considerable growth in employment also, but only from 14,000
to 36,000 (BEA 1998, 2004). Software is not the only corporate asset sub-
ject to international shifting for tax purposes. One news article on such
shifts referred to “. . . patents on drugs, ownership of corporate logos,
techniques for manufacturing processes and other intellectual assets . . .”
and quoted a tax lawyer as calling such moves routine, “‘international tax
planning 101.’” He added that “‘most of the assets that are going to be re-
located as part of a global repositioning are intellectual property . . . that
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Table 1.11 U.S. payments for insurance services, 2001–2006 ($US, millions)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All countries 16,706 22,150 25,234 29,090 28,540 33,582
Canada 343 554 498 664 652 645
Europe 7,121 11,915 12,404 11,836 14,618 17,177
Netherlands 110 142 166 41 11 15
Switzerland 1,232 2,316 2,574 3,029 4,928 5,594
United Kingdom 2,978 3,848 4,134 3,344 3,186 3,134
Latin America and other 
Western Hemisphere 9,082 9,462 12,110 16,334 12,988 15,437
Other Western Hemisphere 9,032 9,383 12,059 16,257 12,935 15,334
Bermuda 7,167 7,499 10,034 11,805 10,227 12,685
Other, Western Hemispherea 1,867 1,884 2,025 4,450 2,708 2,648
Africa 2 4 1 24 30 18
Middle East 4 3 5 12 8 11
Asia and Paciﬁc 132 205 201 206 240 286
Sources: Borga and Mann (2004); Nephew et al. (2005); Koncz, Mann, and Nephew (2006); Koncz and
Flatness (2007).
a“Other, Western Hemisphere” refers to Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Cuba, Do-
minica, French Islands (Caribbean), Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and United Kingdom Islands (At-
lantic).is where most of the proﬁt is. When you buy a pair of sneakers for $250, it’s
the swoosh symbol, not the rubber, you pay for” (Johnston 2002).
1.6 The Deﬁnition of Residence: What does 
the Current Account Balance Measure?
The U.S. Review Committee for Balance of Payments Statistics (1965)
suggested that “balance of payments data are peculiarly elusive” because
“[t]he basic criterion for a balance of payments transaction is that it is be-
tween a domestic and a foreign ‘resident.’ [. . .] The application of this 
set of concepts to concrete situations may involve subtle distinctions, and
it is often diﬃcult to determine residence even when all the facts are
known.[. . .] Distinctions based on the balance of payments concept of res-
idence have not ordinarily been important in the aﬀairs of business ﬁrms,
governments, or households; the concept, therefore, is not normally re-
ﬂected in their records. The balance of payments statistician seeking data
on international transactions from these records ﬁnds himself asking ques-
tions that are likely to be new and alien to the company’s or the agency’s
normal way of thinking” (pp. 16–17).
As the importance of intangible assets has grown, particularly for the
United States, it may no longer be true that questions of residence are new
or alien to the thinking of companies, but the way they have become fa-
miliar to companies is diﬀerent from the way that economists think of
them. For companies, issues of residence, or the location of intangible as-
sets, are important as tools for minimizing taxes, and companies can ma-
nipulate the residence of assets in ways that do not ﬁt with economists’ con-
cepts of trade and production.
What are the economist’s concepts of trade and the current balance?
Meade (1951) deﬁned exports as an element of “. . . demands for goods
and services which directly or indirectly cause a demand for factors of pro-
duction (i.e. for the productive services of land, capital, enterprise and
work) . . .” whose incomes are recorded in the national income. Imports,
correspondingly, lead to a demand for “. . . the productive resources of
other countries” (p. 34)
If the object in the balance of payments is not to measure the physical
movement of goods or services, and trade in services does not involve a
change in ownership, what is the goal of the measurement? Writings about
the balance of trade, and particularly about the balance of payments, have
often had a whiﬀ of mercantilism about them. That used to be especially
clear in the references to “favorable” or “unfavorable” balances. These
terms have virtually disappeared, but they reﬂected the traditional purpose
of the calculations, which was to know whether a country was gaining or
losing gold. In an international regime aiming at stability of exchange
rates, the substitute was the question of demand for and supply of a coun-
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tonomous” and “accommodating” transactions, as in Meade (1951, 11–
16). In the United States, there was a search for the appropriate measure of
balance-of-payments deﬁcits or surpluses, the need for which stemmed
from the fact that “leading countries have established ﬁxed parities for
their currencies and have undertaken to maintain exchange rates within
prescribed margins of those parities” (U.S. Review Committee for Balance
of Payments Statistics 1965, 2). That purpose too has become obsolete. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis, describing concepts underlying the balance
of payments in 1990, does not provide a purpose for the calculation, but de-
ﬁnes it simply as “. . . a statistical summary of international transactions
. . . deﬁned as the transfer of ownership of something that has an economic
value measurable in monetary terms from residents of one country to res-
idents of another” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990, xiii). The article
explaining alternative frameworks for the international accounts (Lande-
feld, Whichard, and Lowe 1993) refers to the “standard balance of pay-
ments” as providing “. . . indicators of returns to domestic versus foreign
factors of production . . .” (p. 51), echoing Meade’s description.
A more recent textbook deﬁnes a country’s current account balance as
“. . . the change in the value of its net claims on the rest of the world—the
change in its net foreign assets” (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ1996, 4). The issue of
residence remains. An intangible or ﬁnancial asset has no real geographi-
cal location; its only deﬁnite location is its ownership. A multinational cor-
porate owner can choose to move the ownership of an intangible asset to
an aﬃliate anywhere in the world. By moving a piece of paper from one
pocket to another, the ﬁrm changes the apparent geographical location of
an asset, of production from that asset, and the direction of trade ﬂows
from its output. Production that had been taking place in the home coun-
try now takes place in the country of assignment of the asset. The home
country, or other former nominal location of the asset, which had been
credited with its output, is now reported to be importing that output. Has
anything really happened? Can we accept that there has been a change in
the reality we are trying to measure, or are we being fooled into thinking
that some economic event has taken place when it has not?
In the cases of international service trade based on intangible assets, if
the assets producing these services are exported to some countries by plac-
ing them on the books of the aﬃliates incorporated there, what local re-
sources are used in producing these services? What is the ﬂow of services
from these exporters that is equivalent to the ﬂow of goods measured in the
goods trade accounts? What would be the signiﬁcance to the U.S. economy
of a rise in the deﬁcit from these imaginary international ﬂows?
If there are what appear to be large distortions in the service trade data,
or extreme ﬂexibility in assigning production of services to locations, they
raise questions about the meaning and purpose of the balance of payments
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formity with IMF (1993) and the SNA (United Nations 1993a), without
much discussion of the underlying purposes of the measurement. They
rarely discuss the implications, if any, of moving from a world in which pro-
duction and trade consist mostly of goods produced by physical capital
and labor to a world in which most output is in the form of services, much
of it produced by intangible assets, and much of goods output, also, is from
intangible inputs. And they rarely discuss the implications of moving from
a world in which production within a ﬁrm is located in a ﬁrm’s home coun-
try to a world in which production within a ﬁrm combines inputs located
in many countries or worse, inputs with no deﬁnite geographical location.
The issue here is not what tax havens and the shifting of assets do to
home and host country tax revenues. The focus is on the tiny tax havens,
because some of them have so little production outside of tax avoidance ac-
tivities that it is relatively clear what is going on there. However, much the
same problem in measuring ﬂows of services must exist, more hidden, in
larger countries. The question is whether we are, by our ways of measuring,
creating phantom international ﬂows of some services that may not be
crossing international borders at all. Services that are produced and con-
sumed entirely within the United States without crossing borders may ap-
pear to be produced in some Caribbean Island or other tax-favored loca-
tion and exported to the United States. What do we learn about the
economy of the United States or of the exporting country from observing
these phantom ﬂows? Some host countries have answered that question by
excluding from their national accounts the activities of these oﬀshore en-
terprises.
The possibility that some imports or exports of services do not actually
cross international borders was illustrated by a recent court proceeding in
a bankruptcy case (Wall Street Journal 2006b). “Funds ﬂowed freely be-
tween the Bermuda entity and New York units and throughout Refco . . .
it employed no one at all at its headquarters address in Bermuda. New
York-based employees ran the unit.” An arrangement recently challenged
by the IRS involved a transfer of major drug patents to a subsidiary in
Bermuda that caused the U.S. parent company to pay royalties to a
Bermuda subsidiary although the patents had been developed by the par-
ent company in the United States (Drucker 2006).
Various ways have been suggested for incorporating production by for-
eign aﬃliates into international accounts by producing accounts on what
is referred to as an ownership rather than a residency basis. One such sug-
gestion was proposed in National Research Council (1992) by a national
Academy of Sciences panel chaired by Robert E. Baldwin, and ampliﬁed
in Baldwin and Kimura (1998) and Kimura and Baldwin (1998). While
such accounts are not intended as replacements for the standard balance
of payments accounts, and are intended for diﬀerent purposes, they do, in
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by combining the operations of parent ﬁrms with those of their foreign
aﬃliates. The Bureau of Economic Analysis now regularly publishes an
ownership-based current account for the United States, explained in Lande-
feld, Whichard, and Lowe (1993). The latest of these is U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2006).
These alternative measures are based on the ownership of the productive
resources or of the ﬁrms in which production takes place, rather than the
location of the resources. In this way, they net out the eﬀects of some of
what are described here as phantom transactions, although they do not re-
move them from the standard accounts. However, the cost is that these ac-
counts provide no information on the location of production.
Given the ease with which the nominal location of production, imports,
and exports from ﬁnancial and intangible assets can be manipulated, is
there a better method for tracing the path of these variables? The problem
is similar to that faced by the European Commission in suggesting the need
for an agreed way of allocating proﬁts among a ﬁrm’s locations, overriding
the allocations on the ﬁrms’ books (see, e.g., Wall Street Journal 2006a).
For an individual ﬁrm, the actual location of production might be better
represented by ignoring the nominal geographical location of ﬁnancial and
intangible assets on the ﬁrm’s books, attributing to parent companies the
ownership of these assets, the production from them, and the trade from
that production. That could be done by the statistical authorities of any of
the few countries that survey the outward direct investment activities of
their countries’ ﬁrms, as the BEA does for the United States.
The simplest case is that of aﬃliate holdings in other foreign aﬃliates,
which clearly do not contribute to production and exports in the aﬃliate’s
host country. They probably do not distort the reported host country export
data, but they inﬂate aﬃliate income in those countries by including income
earned elsewhere. For U.S. aﬃliates worldwide, these holdings were 23 per-
cent of total assets in 2005, but they were almost half in the Netherlands and
in aﬃliates in “Other Western Hemisphere, n.e.c.”, and over a third in
Switzerland and Bermuda (U.S. Department of Commerce, BEA 2007).
Under the extreme assumption that all assets other than inventories and
property, plant, and equipment should be attributed to the parent ﬁrm, on
the grounds that they have no speciﬁc geographical location and could be
placed anywhere by the parent ﬁrm, the eﬀect on aﬃliate assets would be
much larger. For U.S. aﬃliates worldwide, assets would be reduced to 12
percent of the reported total. In Ireland and Switzerland, they would be
only 6 percent. In Barbados, less than 2 percent of reported assets would
remain and in Bermuda and U.K. Islands in the Caribbean, only 1 percent.
From the published data, one cannot match the asset holdings with the ex-
porters of services, as opposed to goods. It would be possible, with access
to the original questionnaires, to match the portfolio holdings with the ex-
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were produced essentially without local labor and with only assets that had
no clear geographical location.
While this way of estimating exports of services could be carried out for
trade with U.S.-owned aﬃliates, it does not solve the problem of trade with
other countries’ aﬃliates. Some host countries exclude aﬃliates that oper-
ate only outside the country from their national accounts. In that case,
their sales of services abroad do not appear in host country export data.
However, they can still be counted in the imports of services by other coun-
tries from that host country. Unless the home countries of the aﬃliates’
parents survey their own foreign investors, there is no obvious way to at-
tribute these imports to the country where they are actually produced.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
Exports and imports of services are more diﬃcult to deﬁne and measure
than trade in goods, and as a consequence, their size and growth are much
less certain. The reported world total value in 2005 was about 2.5 trillion
of exports and a similar amount of imports, approximately one-quarter of
world trade in goods.
The trend in the importance of service exports and imports is even harder
to measure, because the number of services covered and the number of
countries measuring service exports and imports has increased, especially
since 1975. Despite those increases, there is only slight evidence of a rise in
the importance of service exports and imports relative to goods trade.
Since the United States has been a leader in measuring service exports
and imports, the U.S. data are more complete than those for the world. Ser-
vice exports have recently been over 40 percent of goods exports, while ser-
vice imports have been only about 20 percent of goods imports. However,
service imports have recently been growing faster than service exports.
Attempts to translate these trends in nominal ratios of service to goods
trade into ratios in real terms face the almost complete absence of data on
prices of traded services. Use of domestic price measures as proxies faces
the problem that even domestic service prices are poorly measured and
subject to many criticisms, and the fact that the composition of domestic
service production and consumption is very diﬀerent from that of interna-
tionally traded services.
Relative to goods and services output, U.S. service exports and imports
are much smaller than goods exports and imports, especially the imports.
Service exports and imports are about 4 to 5 percent of services output,
while goods imports are almost 40 percent and goods exports are over 20
percent of goods output. Both goods and services exports are at histori-
cally high levels relative to output, compared to the period since 1869, and
the same is true for goods imports, which have risen steadily since 1950 af-
ter a long secular decline from 1869 to World War II. Changes in services
60 Robert E. Lipseyimports relative to services output have been much smaller: the ratio for
1990 to 1999 was almost identical to that for 1869 to 1873, but the ratio for
2000 to 2006 was 15 percent higher.
The measures of service trade, because they are not anchored in any ob-
servation of physical movement, are, much more than those of goods trade,
determined by the deﬁnition of residence, since residence, rather than an
observed movement of a ﬁnal product, determines what is an export or im-
port. The problem is illustrated by the case of trade in educational services,
because the determination that an ostensibly domestic transaction is an im-
port or export rests on a diﬀerence in residence between the provider and
the acquirer of the service. A paradoxical aspect of this deﬁnition is that,
especially in the United States, much of the exported educational service
never leaves the United States because the recipients decide to become U.S.
residents. What would be necessary to close this gap between the service
trade measure and reality would be an account for ﬂows of human capital
that would show the service imported into the United States in the form of
human capital. An alternative would be to treat the educational expendi-
ture as an internal trade within the United States until the recipient crossed
the border to return home, if he or she did so, and then enter it into exports
of services. A drawback of this scheme is that it would not account for the
reimport of previously exported services when the recipient of a U.S. edu-
cation returned to the United States at a later date.
A serious problem for the measurement of service trade, and also for the
measurement of the location of output of both goods and services, is the
growing importance of intangible inputs, including intellectual assets, in
production, because these assets do not have a clear geographical location.
The same is true for ﬁnancial assets. One consequence of this growth is the
expanding use by parent ﬁrms of the placement of intangible and ﬁnancial
assets in low tax jurisdictions. Since the assets are intangible, including ﬁ-
nancial assets, patents, trademarks, rights to designs, and corporate logos,
they have no particular geographical location, and their ownership can be
moved by the parent company of a multinational to any of its aﬃliates. The
result is that the output and exports stemming from these assets can also
be attributed to geographical locations almost at will, subject to some lim-
ited regulation by tax authorities, without any relation to the actual loca-
tion of any physical aspect of the production. A large part of service pro-
duction, exports, and imports, and some part of goods production can
begin to consist of phantom production and trade that makes no use of fac-
tors of production actually resident in the countries to which they are at-
tributed. If that takes place to an important degree, the measures of the
current balance and national output begin to lose their meaning.
For trade with U.S. aﬃliates, it is possible to consolidate the operations
of multinational parents and their aﬃliates in the data, counting as trade
only transactions outside the multinational ﬁrm, between segments of
the ﬁrm and unaﬃliated entities. The closest approximation to this is the
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rated into the international transactions accounts or national accounts in
general and, as they are constructed, provide no data on the geographical
location of production.
It may be that the calculation of trade ﬂows, particularly for services—
but to some extent for goods as well—and the related calculations of the
location of production, have reached the stage that calculations of capital
consumption reached many years ago. That stage was the decision by sta-
tistical agencies to abandon the reliance on corporate accounting for cap-
ital consumption, because corporate accounts were too distorted by dif-
ferences in assumptions and by tax considerations, and to substitute
statistical and econometric estimation of capital consumption based on
other types of data.
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Appendix
Table 1A.1 Goods and service exports and imports by ﬁxed sets of countries, ﬁve-year averages,
1972–2006, and year, 2005 ($US, billions)
22 Countriesa 30 Countriesb
Goods Services Goods Services
Year Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
1972–1976 375.8 355.4 79.0 85.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1977–1981 806.1 776.0 168.7 188.3 1,101.9 1,071.3 241.7 264.5
1982–1986 924.1 964.9 221.1 243.1 1,312.9 1,305.3 306.3 333.0
1987–1991 1,512.9 1,563.1 383.7 394.3 2,167.4 2,122.4 534.4 570.3
1992–1996 2,140.8 2,164.3 582.2 563.7 3,058.0 2,925.1 795.3 819.1
1997–2001 2,739.6 2,914.7 755.0 728.6 3,810.5 3,851.7 999.2 1,012.6
2002–2006 3,785.1 4,200.7 1,072.6 1,031.2 5,272.5 5,539.5 1,456.6 1,414.8
2005 4,353.0 4,798.4 1,216.9 1,169.1 6,047.1 6,382.9 1,681.6 1,617.0
World: 150 Countries
Goods Services
Credit Debit Credit Debit
2005 9,779.1 9,856.4 2,486.7 2,370.8
Source: IMF (2007).
Note: n.a.   not available.
aThe twenty-two countries include Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Rep.,
Germany, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
bThe 30 countries include the twenty-two countries, plus Argentina, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Den-
mark, Finland, France, India, and Japan.Table 1A.2 U.S. trade in goods and services, decade averages, 1790–1999 and
average of 2000–2006 ($US, millions)
Services Goods
Year Exports Imports Exports Imports
1790–1799a 14.5 2.2 43.5 53.9
1800–1809 28.2 3.9 75.9 96.4
1810–1819 20.2 2.1 59.8 82.0
1820–1829b 12.4 2.3 69.7 74.1
1830–1839 13.0 3.9 98.7 118.0
1840–1849 18.4 5.8 118.0 113.8
1850–1859 24.8 26.3 231.6 277.1
1860–1869c, d 29.4 43.5 263.6 333.7
1870–1879 35.2 60.8 566.7 525.9
1880–1889 36.8 91.9 780.8 714.3
1890–1899 37.6 104.2 980.3 770.0
1900–1909e 36.8 209.6 1,705.1 1,157.7
1910–1919 251 642 4,255 2,304
1920–1929 530 869 5,151 4,034
1930–1939 398 659 2,710 2,261
1930–1939 440 660 2,700 2,260
1940–1949 1,610 2,200 7,730 4,550
1950–1959 3,570 5,310 14,760 11,840
1960–1969 9,390 9,890 27,740 23,130
1970–1979 28,270 24,490 99,730 108,710
1980–1989 86,870 73,320 251,370 344,090
1990–1999 223,890 150,350 550,550 724,790
2000–2006 348,843 275,843 813,329 1,423,786
Sources: 1790–1860: North (1960, tables A-4, B-2, and B-3); 1861–1900: Simon (1960, table
27); 1901–1939: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, table U 1–25, 864–66; 1930–2006: BEA
website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Dec. 24, 2007).
aFrom 1790 to 1819, exports of services include only freight earnings; imports of services in-
clude only payments for insurance; exports of goods include exports of merchandise and sales
of ships.
bFrom 1820 to 1860, exports of services include freight earnings, port charges, and tourist ex-
penditures; imports of services include freight payments to foreign ships and tourist expen-
ditures; exports of goods include exports of merchandise and sales of ships.
cExports and imports of goods in 1860 include specie.
dFrom 1861 to 1900, exports of services are equal to total shipping income plus foreign tourist
expenditures plus port outlays of foreign passenger steamships; imports of services are equal
to total shipping payments plus U.S. tourist expenditures. Exports of goods are the sum of ex-
ports of merchandise and the sales of ships.
eFrom 1901 to 1970, exports of services are sums of transportation, travel, and other transac-
tions; imports of services are sums of transportation, travel, direct military expenditures, and
other transactions.Table 1A.3 U.S. trade in and output of services, current prices, 1869–2006
Output (%)
Exports  Imports  Output of services 
Year ($US, millions) ($US, millions) ($US, billions) Exports Imports
1869–1873 37 59 1.6 2.34 3.74
1872–1881 35 64 2.1 1.68 3.12
1882–1891 38 100 3.0 1.27 3.38
1892–1901 36 112 3.9 0.93 2.86
1902–1911 43 249 7.7 0.55 3.23
1912–1921 405 766 15.1 2.68 5.07
1922–1931 450 854 28.7 1.57 2.98
1930–1939 398 659 31.6 1.26 2.09
1930–1939 440 660 31.6 1.39 2.09
1940–1949 1,610 2,200 79.6 2.02 2.76
1950–1959 3,570 5,310 156.2 2.29 3.40
1960–1969 9,390 9,890 310.9 3.02 3.18
1970–1979 28,270 24,490 771.7 3.66 3.17
1980–1989 86,870 73,320 2,074.8 4.19 3.53
1990–1999 223,890 150,350 4,040.2 5.54 3.72
2000–2006 348,843 275,843 6,458.1 5.40 4.27
Sources: Exports and Imports 1869–1900: Ten-year averages calculated from Simon (1960).
Exports and Imports 1901–1939: Ten-year averages calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus (1975, table U 1–25, 864–66). Exports and Imports 1930–2006: Ten-year averages calcu-
lated from BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Dec. 24, 2007).
Output of Services 1869–1931: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, table F 71–97, 231). Output
of Services 1930–2006: Ten-year averages calculated from BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/
bea/dn1.htm (downloaded on Dec. 24, 2007).Table 1A.4 U.S. trade in and output of goods, current prices, 1869–2006
Output (%)
Exports  Imports  Output of goods 
Year ($US, millions) ($US, millions) ($US, billions) Exports Imports
1869–1873 438 545 4.2 10.45 13.01
1872–1881 656 561 5.0 13.09 11.20
1882–1891 783 751 7.0 11.26 10.80
1892–1901 1,099 777 8.3 13.23 9.35
1902–1911 1,829 1,299 14.9 12.26 8.71
1912–1921 5,140 2,781 31.7 16.22 8.77
1922–1931 4,487 3,761 46.9 9.56 8.01
1930–1939 2,710 2,261 39.5 6.86 5.72
1930–1939 2,700 2,260 39.5 6.83 5.72
1940–1949 7,730 4,550 106.1 7.29 4.29
1950–1959 14,760 11,840 195.5 7.55 6.06
1960–1969 27,740 23,130 317.5 8.74 7.29
1970–1979 99,730 108,710 691.0 14.43 15.73
1980–1989 251,370 344,090 1,544.2 16.28 22.28
1990–1999 550,550 724,790 2,611.8 21.08 27.75
2000–2006 813,329 1,423,786 3,615.6 22.49 39.38
Sources: Exports and Imports 1869–1900: Ten-year averages calculated from Simon (1960).
Exports and Imports 1901–1939: Ten-year averages calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus (1975, table U 1–25, 864–66). Exports and Imports 1930–2006: Ten-year averages calcu-
lated from BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Dec. 24, 2007).
Output of Services 1869–1931: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, table F 71–97, 231). Output
of Services 1930–2006: Ten-year averages calculated from BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/
bea/dn1.htm (downloaded on Dec. 24, 2007).
Table 1A.5 U.S. exports and imports of services and goods in 2000 prices, ﬁve-year
averages, 1929–2000 and average of 2001–2006 ($US billions)
Goods Services Services/goods (%)
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1929–1935 17.8 27.6 5.4 7.3 30.39 26.28
1936–1940 21.5 31.2 7.0 6.8 32.59 21.88
1941–1945 18.0 30.6 7.7 17.2 42.59 56.01
1946–1950 44.5 38.2 13.7 12.0 30.72 31.50
1951–1955 42.4 46.5 15.3 24.2 36.00 51.94
1956–1960 53.7 60.1 23.8 35.3 44.37 58.81
1961–1965 69.2 80.1 35.0 40.1 50.57 50.08
1966–1970 91.4 134.5 49.6 54.5 54.30 40.57
1971–1975 134.1 186.6 66.0 59.0 49.26 31.63
1976–1980 183.7 243.7 86.6 65.7 47.12 26.97
1981–1985 208.8 295.2 107.2 87.7 51.34 29.71
1986–1990 298.4 437.1 157.0 127.7 52.61 29.22
1991–1995 452.3 577.0 221.0 142.7 48.86 24.73
1996–2000 682.8 989.7 289.0 194.6 42.32 19.67
2001–2006 786.4 1,403.2 331.8 253.7 42.19 18.08
Source: BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Sept. 25, 2007).Table 1A.6 U.S. exports and imports of goods and output of goods in 2000 prices,
ﬁve-year averages, 1929–2000 and average of 2001–2006
Exports and imports 
of goods as percent 
of output
Output of goods 
($US, billions) Exports Imports
1929–1935 215.3 8.24 12.84
1936–1940 278.5 7.72 11.21
1941–1945 439.3 4.09 6.97
1946–1950 513.5 8.66 7.43
1951–1955 606.2 6.99 7.67
1956–1960 687.3 7.82 8.74
1961–1965 811.5 8.53 9.87
1966–1970 1,031.9 8.85 13.03
1971–1975 1,221.8 10.97 15.27
1976–1980 1,476.1 12.45 16.51
1981–1985 1,685.3 12.39 17.52
1986–1990 2,083.2 14.32 20.98
1991–1995 2,403.1 18.82 24.01
1996–2000 3,070.9 22.24 32.23
2001–2006 3,641.4 21.59 38.53
Source: BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Sept. 25, 2007).
Table 1A.7 U.S. exports and imports of services and output of services in 2000 prices,
ﬁve-year averages, 1929–2000 and average of 2001–2006
Exports and imports
of services as percent
of output
Output of services 
($US, billions) Exports Imports
1929–1935 441.6 1.22 1.64
1936–1940 505.5 1.39 1.35
1941–1945 1,073.3 0.71 1.60
1946–1950 870.6 1.57 1.38
1951–1955 1,149.3 1.33 2.10
1956–1960 1,336.6 1.78 2.64
1961–1965 1,646.0 2.13 2.44
1966–1970 2,111.9 2.35 2.58
1971–1975 2,460.7 2.68 2.40
1976–1980 2,854.0 3.03 2.30
1981–1985 3,259.1 3.29 2.69
1986–1990 3,923.7 4.00 3.26
1991–1995 4,459.1 4.96 3.20
1996–2000 5,079.0 5.69 3.83
2001–2006 5,899.6 5.62 4.30
Source: BEA website, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm (downloaded on Sept. 25, 2007).References
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